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A B S T R A C T 
 
 
Introduction:  The Asia–Pacific region is the likeliest location for the next significant outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI). Indonesia has experienced HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry and humans each year since 2003 and has had the highest case 
fatality rate for human cases. The purposes of this study were to capture the knowledge of avian influenza and of poultry-raising 
practices in two regions of Indonesia and to evaluate the impact and extent of activities undertaken to 2010 through the National 
Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control at the village level. 
Methods:  A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was used to investigate the multiple influences on behaviours, 
decisions and actions taken by poultry-raising households, and by villages and communities, regarding the threat of HPAI. Between 
June 2010 and May 2011 a structured survey of 400 households was conducted on Lombok and of 402 on Bali, inviting Sector 3 
(small-scale independent commercial poultry farms) and Sector 4 (village household) poultry raisers to participate. Focus groups and 
in-depth interviews were convened with key stakeholders, including livestock and animal health and public health officials, 
community leaders and villagers. 
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Results:  From the focus group and in-depth interviews, it appears that the flow of information through the national HPAI control 
program has been efficient at the top levels (from national to provincial, then to districts and subdistricts). However, these findings 
show that effective transmission of information from subdistrict to rural village level and from village leaders to community 
members has been limited. The degree of community preparedness for HPAI on Bali and Lombok appears minimal. Knowledge of 
government activities was more extensive at Bali sites, while only limited government programs and activities occurred at the village 
level on Lombok. Activities conducted by government agencies from provincial to village level were limited in scope and need to be 
further developed to ensure safe poultry-handling practices and biosecurity measures. On both Bali and Lombok, community 
respondents knew the signs and symptoms of sick birds but did not differentiate well between HPAI and other bird diseases. On 
both islands, more than 60% of respondents were reluctant to report sudden deaths of poultry. The lack of a government 
compensation program for destroyed flocks contributed to this unwillingness to report. 
Conclusions:  While the Indonesian government’s planning efforts for HPAI are commendable, the plan has not been effective, as 
it depends on the cooperative actions of people with small rural farms who have not been consulted in the development of the plan, 
have not been adequately instructed on the nature of the plan, and perceive no benefits to themselves from prevention efforts. 
Context-appropriate mechanisms for communicating zoonotic risk and options for risk mitigation that do not result in net loss to 
poor households are also needed. 
 
Key words: Asia, community preparedness, highly pathogenic avian influenza, influenza, pandemic, poultry. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Asia–Pacific region is considered the likeliest location for 
the epicentre of the next significant outbreak of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)1,2. Reasons for this include 
the ideal conditions in the region for infectious disease 
emergence, particularly of zoonotic disease, such as 
population growth, mobility, urbanisation, livestock 
intensification and changes to land use, plus the close 
proximity of high-density human and animal populations and 
ecological conditions conducive to enhanced mutation/host 
adaptation of agents including limited regulation of drug use3. 
The public health and health service infrastructure of many 
countries in this region is presently deemed inadequate to 
provide an effective response2,4. Adequate, high-quality 
laboratory facilities5 and surveillance systems6 proximal to 
outbreak origin are needed. Resources to plan for and 
respond to a pandemic in the region are being developed7, 
but these efforts are still in relatively early stages. 
 
The magnitude of the next major pandemic, in epidemiologic 
terms of pathogenicity, infectivity and virulence, cannot be 
predicted with any degree of certainty8. The likely 
effectiveness of interventions to mitigate the severity of 
disease, including social controls, is not well known. While 
transmission of HPAI (including H5 and H7 viruses) from 
poultry to humans to date appears infrequent9, exposure and 
infection risks are evident10, although still poorly 
understood11. Previous research in Indonesia has suggested 
that areas with primarily household poultry raising have a 
higher risk of HPAI outbreaks12. Since HPAI viruses cause 
systemic infection in chickens and replicate in respiratory and 
intestinal tracts, handling and slaughter of birds poses risk for 
human exposure, making safe poultry handling and 
slaughtering practices essential to prevent exposure12-14. The 
recent development of easily transmissible laboratory 
mutants in the Netherlands is of real concern regarding the 
pandemic potential of these viruses15. The dynamics of viral 
genetic variability16 and the close proximity of poultry and 
humans, particularly in Asia, provide potential for increased 
risk of human pandemics11. Safe poultry handling practices 
are essential. 
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Regarding future highly pathogenic influenza epidemics, 
some near-certainties can be anticipated. South-East Asia is an 
area enzootic for HPAI, with continuing potential for spread 
from birds to humans17. The causative organism will be a 
novel variant virus, probably sourced from birds, that 
acquires an ability to transmit efficiently in humans18. There 
will be a crucial time lag before an effective vaccine can be 
formulated, manufactured and distributed19. Human factors 
will affect the spread of infectious disease20. Finally, public 
health and healthcare systems in affected areas will be 
severely overloaded during the acute phase or phases of the 
pandemic21. 
 
In the ongoing HPAI H5N1 pandemic that has had an impact 
on poultry systems across several continents, Indonesia is a 
notable infected country, having experienced HPAI (flu 
burung in Indonesian) outbreaks in poultry and humans each 
year since 2003, with the highest case fatality rate for human 
cases, at 83.2%22. Several features of the poultry industry and 
of community and government practice contribute to the 
endemic infection cycle in Indonesia23. Transportation and 
management of birds at local and regional Indonesian markets 
have been shown to lack recommended biosecurity measures, 
such as use of gloves and masks or prevention of sick birds 
from being sold in marketplaces24,25. Illegal transport 
(smuggling) of birds from non-infected to infected provinces 
is common and poorly controlled25. Pigs, which can serve as 
asymptomatic intermediate hosts, often have contact with 
poultry in village settings26. Government control efforts have 
been viewed as ineffectual2,23,25,27 but improving28. Outbreaks 
of HPAI are devastating to a local economy29. 
 
This study reports on knowledge of avian influenza and of 
poultry-raising practices in two rural island regions of 
Indonesia, Lombok and Bali. This evaluation was carried out 
by an international inter-professional team on the impact and 
extent of activities undertaken to 2010 through the National 
Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Contro, a three-part plan of 
goals, targets and strategies for HPAI control in Indonesia. 
The present research focused on three of the 10 main 
strategies: protection of high-risk groups (Strategy 3); 
epidemiological surveillance on animals and humans (Strategy 
4); and risk communication, information and public 
awareness (Strategy 6)30. The task of rolling out programs 
such as this in Indonesia is complex, partly due to the 
geography of the archipelago and partly because of funding 
and governmental infrastructural issues such as 
decentralisation. 
 
Methods 
 
Study site/population 
 
As regional contextual issues of cultural diversity should 
inform modifications to program activities to ensure 
relevance for local settings, the authors sought to investigate 
the level of HPAI focused activities and the learning gained 
from these on two islands in eastern Indonesia. Bali and 
Lombok, geographically adjacent islands both with reliance 
on tourism, were chosen, as they offered interesting 
similarities and differences. The poultry industry on both 
islands consists of only Sector 3 farms and Sector 4 poultry-
raising households31, the poultry sectors that are the focus of 
national poultry HPAI surveillance activities and of reported 
poultry cases since 2003–2004. However for HPAI 
occurrence, Bali, with probably endemic poultry infection, 
has experienced few human cases compared to Lombok, 
which until 2011 had few poultry cases and no human cases. 
Whilst similar to most of Indonesia, village poultry 
ownership is extensive on both islands, providing economic 
and nutritional benefits. On Bali, chickens and ducks are 
particularly important in daily life for Hindu religious 
practices, with birds of certain colours needed for different 
ceremonies2. 
 
Poultry raisers in Indonesia fall into one of four sectors as 
delineated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) classification scheme14. Sector 1 
consists of large-scale commercial producers, Sector 2 of 
large independent producers, Sector 3 of small-scale 
independent commercial poultry farms (the largest sector in 
Indonesia) and Sector 4 of village households keeping 
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poultry. The present research focused on Sectors 3 and 4 on 
Bali and Lombok, Indonesia. 
 
Study design 
 
Two study sites were selected purposively on each island to 
include one small rural community that had experienced 
HPAI outbreaks, human and/or poultry (the affected site) 
and one community that had few or no poultry outbreaks, in 
order to identify any differences in knowledge and attitudes 
that might be attributed to experience with an outbreak. On 
Bali, the sites selected were a community that had 
experienced many HPAI poultry outbreaks and a human case 
– Negara Subdistrict (Jembrana District) – and one that had 
very few poultry cases – Manggis Subdistrict (Karangasem 
District). On Lombok, the two sites were one that had 
experienced HPAI outbreaks in poultry – Pringgasela 
subdistrict (East Lombok District) – and one community with 
no poultry outbreaks – Pujut subdistrict (Central Lombok 
District). They are referred to throughout as the affected and 
non-affected sites. 
 
This research was conducted by an international inter-
professional team32 with members from veterinary science 
epidemiology, public health epidemiology, medical 
anthropology, paediatrics and immunology, medical practice, 
medical academia, agriculture economics and rural 
development. A combination of qualitative methods (focus 
groups and in-depth interviews) was used to investigate the 
multiple influences on behaviours, decisions and actions taken 
by poultry-raising households, and by villages and 
communities regarding the threat of HPAI. 
 
Pilot studies were carried out on both islands, results of 
which were used to amend and refine the questionnaires and 
fine tune interview and focus group methods. 
 
Data collection 
 
Between June 2010 and May 2011 a structured survey was 
conducted of 400 households in Lombok and of 402 in Bali, 
inviting Sector 3 and 4 poultry raisers to participate. Two 
structured questionnaires were used: one for Sector 3 and 
one for Sector 4. Each questionnaire consisted of seven 
sections: participant demographics, poultry flock and 
management, management of sick/dead birds, slaughter of 
poultry, HPAI knowledge and perceptions, HPAI 
occurrence, and activities on HPAI. Surveys were 
administered by a team of trained surveyors during individual 
face-to-face interviews with the poultry carer in each 
randomly selected household. These structured surveys 
identified factors influencing the HPAI awareness and 
practices of poultry owners. 
 
At each island’s two study sites, four focus groups were 
conducted separately with community leaders, villagers who 
owned poultry, animal health agencies and human health 
agencies. Each focus group consisted of 8–10 participants and 
lasted 1–2 hours. In Lombok, there were 79 participants in 
the eight focus groups: 41 participants from the affected site 
and 38 from the non-affected sites. In Bali there were 
77 participants in the eight focus groups: 42 from the affected 
site and 35 from the non-affected site. 
 
Both men and women were encouraged to participate; 
however, there were fewer women participants than men 
because, in the group, community leaders and villagers (heads 
of households) women are not always represented. In 
Lombok, five of the eight focus groups had men and women 
participating; in Bali, six focus groups had women 
participating. The overall age range of all participants was 
20–50 years. 
 
In-depth interviews with 44 key informants from each of the 
above groups were conducted at each site to capture in more 
detail experiences of individuals, their sociocultural, 
economic and environmental views; and the needs, values, 
beliefs and everyday practices that constitute their response 
to HPAI. In total, 17 key informants were interviewed in Bali 
(including two women); in Lombok, 27 key informants were 
interviewed. Key informants included people who had lost 
birds or relatives due to HPAI infection or had birds 
identified as H5N1-infected, and local animal and human 
health employees charged with HPAI control activities. All 
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interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed for data 
analysis. All participants gave verbal consent for involvement 
and were informed that data would be de-identified prior to 
analysis. 
 
Research team members trained Indonesian anthropology 
graduates in conducting focus group facilitation, in-depth 
interviews, audio recording, making observations and 
transcribing. All focus groups and in-depth interviews were 
conducted in Balinese, or Sasak (Lombok) and/or Indonesian 
language, recorded, and transcribed and translated where 
necessary into Indonesian. All quotations cited are English 
translations of the Indonesian. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Qualitative data were coded and analysed using a manual 
review of transcripts for theme and content. Dominant 
themes were identified with similar thematic content across 
both the focus groups and interviews. The same theme was 
often present across more than one focus group. Themes that 
supported appropriately the objectives of the research were 
then analysed for content along the lines of grounded theory33 
for coding, theme and content analysis. Coding continued 
until dominant themes were clearly identified. Several core 
themes in the qualitative data were consistent with findings in 
the quantitative data. Several core themes in the qualitative 
data were consistent with findings in the quantitative data34. 
Thus, the two bodies of data supported and enhanced each 
other. 
 
This combination of methods, along with the interdisciplinary 
composition of the research team, was developed to enhance 
validity of the results through methodologic, investigator and 
data triangulation35. 
 
Ethics approval 
 
Ethics approval was obtained from The University of Sydney 
Human Research Ethics Committee (no. 12885, 14 May 
2010), the Ethical and Scientific Research Committee 
National Institute of Health Research & Development, 
Ministry of Health, Republic of Indonesia (No. 
LB.03.03/KE/036/2010, 6 January 2010), and the ethics 
committees of Universitas Udayana, Bali and Universitas 
Mataram, Lombok. Permission was also sought and received 
from the Animal Sector Ministry of Agriculture, Indonesia, 
for their employees to serve as respondents. 
 
 
Results 
 
Description of participants 
 
Across the four sites, most of the 654 respondents from 
Sector 4 had only attended elementary (primary) school 
(38.5%), and a substantial number had never been to school 
(21.9%). Table 1 provides a description of people who 
participated in the structured household survey by gender and 
site. 
 
HPAI activities, information sources and 
information flow 
 
On Bali, from the survey, 103 of 188 (55%) of Sector 4 
respondents in Negara (affected site) and 49 of 136 (36%) of 
Sector 4 respondents in Manggis (non-affected site) were 
aware of HPAI prevention activities in their village. For 
Sector 3 respondents, these figures were 11/14 (71%) and 
41/64 (64%). On Lombok, only 9 of 330 (3%) of Sector 4 
and 8/70 (11%) of Sector 3 respondents were aware of such 
activities. 
 
Distribution of available information sources (brochures, 
posters, leaflets) was reportedly limited, according to the 
survey results. On Bali, in Negara, 46 of 188 (24.5%) of 
respondents reported seeing a poster and 2 (1.1%) being 
given a brochure or leaflet on HPAI. In Manggis, these figures 
were 46/136 (33.8%) for seeing posters and 
18/136 (13.2%) for being given a brochure. On Lombok, 23 
of 330 (7%) reported seeing either a poster or brochure. 
 
 
 
 
C Hunter, HH Birden, J-A Toribio, R Booy, M Abdurrahman, AIGAA Ambarawati, N Adiputra, 2014.  A licence to publish this material has been given to James 
Cook University, http://www.rrh.org.au  6 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Participants by site, gender and identity group 
 
 Household survey Focus group 
 Sector 3 Sector 4 Animal health staff Public health staff Community 
leaders 
Villagers 
Gender n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Bali, Manggis Subdistrict, non-affected site 
 Male 58 90.6 82 60.2 4 67 6 75 11 100 8 80 
 Female 6 9.4 54 39.7 2 33 2 25   2 20 
 Total 64  136  6  8  11  10  
Bali, Negara Subdistrict, affected site 
 Male 12 85.7 124 66 7 64 9 90 8 89 12 100 
 Female 2 14.3 64 34 4 36 1 10 1 11   
 Total 14  188  11  10  9  12  
Lombok, Pujut Subdistrict, non-affected site 
 Male 33 82.5 65 40.6 6 75 7 70 10 100 10 100 
 Female 7 17.5 95 59·4 2 25 3 30 0    
 Total 40  160  8  10  10  10  
Lombok, Pringgasela Subdistrict, affected site 
 Male 26 86.7 91 53.5 6 75 2 20 11 100 8 80 
 Female 4 13.3 79 46.5 2 25 8 80 0  2 20 
 Total 30  170  8  10  11  10  
 
 
 
 
Several focus groups and in-depth interviews corroborated 
that attempts to disseminate written information were not 
only insufficient but also largely ineffectual because such 
materials were not retained. For example, as stated by a 
participant in the villager focus group discussions at the 
affected site in Lombok: 
 
that’s the problem with the brochures. … Sometimes when we 
give to the community they just put them in their pockets … 
sometimes they throw it away … 
 
Sometimes the materials are not read: 
 
… we pasted some by the intersection, village offices are full 
of flu burung stickers, but willingness to read in our 
community is low … 
 
The need for more knowledge and information is poignantly 
demonstrated by one health worker when speaking about 
protection for personnel from infectious disease: 
 
In my opinion what’s needed is how the health staff protects 
themselves. Maybe that information is necessary, so before he 
handles the case he already understands what to prepare to 
protect himself so that he doesn’t contract [flu 
burung]. Maybe that’s very important so that if our staff go 
to the field or handle the case at this health clinic we are not 
worried. So it’s similar to the AIDS in the past. All used to be 
afraid but after it was made clear that AIDS can be like this, 
can be prevented by this, the staff became calmer. The same 
with flu burung, don’t let the staff unaware of how to manage 
it, he will become afraid. 
 
Animal health workers reported that an increase in rabies 
cases had resulted in diversion of effort from HPAI to rabies 
prevention efforts. 
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Poultry management 
 
Housing:  On Lombok, 159 of 330 (48%) of Sector 4 
respondents reported keeping their chickens in cages or pens 
while 98/330 (30%) did not, with the remainder reporting 
that sometimes they kept the birds in the cages or pens while 
at other times not. This latter group of respondents explained 
that when the birds are still young (after hatching from the 
egg) they are kept in cages, and after the birds mature they 
are allowed to free range. 
 
On Bali, the number of Sector 4 respondents that reported 
keeping their birds in cages was markedly lower, at 
74/324 (22.8%). Here, too, there was a notable difference 
between the affected site and the unaffected site (26.9% in 
Negara, affected, vs 19.1% in Manggis, non-affected). Most 
birds scavenge around households, moving freely during the 
day and sleeping in trees at night. Sector 4 respondents 
expressed a concern that cages make the work of chicken 
thieves easier. As demand for birds of all types on Bali always 
exceeds supply, smuggling and theft are ongoing problems. 
 
All Sector 3 respondents in all study sites reported keeping 
poultry in pens/cages. 
 
Sick and dead bird management, consumption, and 
reporting:   While community respondents on both Bali and 
Lombok knew the signs and symptoms of sick birds, they did 
not differentiate well between HPAI and other bird diseases 
such as Newcastle disease (koyan, grubug or sasab). In Lombok 
there was particular confusion between HPAI and other bird 
diseases, especially Newcastle disease (koyan or manuk koyan 
in East Lombok, grubug or ende (ND = Newcastle disease) in 
Central Lombok). 
 
For the community, when there’s a sudden death, that’s koyan 
not flu burung, because the poultry has never been sick [with 
flu burung]. 
 
On Lombok, a greater proportion of respondents reported 
willingness to sell or eat sick birds than on Bali (Table 2). A 
participant of the village focus group at the non-affected 
Lombok site supported this finding: 
 
If there is a sick bird in the flock, then all chickens will be 
sold live. Or sometimes we slaughter for ourselves. 
 
The majority of respondents at each site, irrespective of sector, 
reported safe disposal of dead birds by burning or burying 
carcasses (Table 3). However, on Bali, 50/136 (36.8%) of Sector 
4 respondents in Manggis and 95/324 (29.3%) in Negara 
reported sales to dead bird collectors. Low numbers of 
respondents did report discarding carcasses in waterways, 
consuming dead birds, feeding them to fish or dogs, and doing 
nothing with carcasses. 
 
On both Bali and Lombok, approximately half of respondents 
were reluctant to report sudden deaths of poultry (Table 4). 
The lack of a government compensation program for 
destroyed flocks contributed to this unwillingness to report. 
For example, one person from an affected site focus group 
said: 
 
When farmers report, they are only given advice to destroy the 
animal because there is no compensation to cull birds. 
 
Thus the social and economic cost to an individual poultry 
farmer or a householder who has lost birds during an HPAI 
outbreak is considerable. 
 
People living at the study site where a human case of HPAI 
had occurred in Bali were more aware of HPAI prevention 
programs than those in villages where no human HPAI had 
occurred. For example, according to the participants in the 
focus group of the human health office, nearly all villages in 
Jembrana District had active desa siaga (‘alert village’) 
programs. One public health staff participant of the focus 
group of the affected site in Bali said they had established a 
team for tackling flu burung and then continued with: 
 
Because we, for example, go to monitor desa siaga. We ask 
everyone. We ask what is established, especially in the village 
context. Is this still functioning or not, is it still effective or not? 
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Table 2:  Sick bird management across affected and non-affected sites on Bali and Lombok† 
 
Bali  
Manggis, non-affected site Sector 3, n=64 Sector 4, n=136 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds 28 43.8 48 35.2 
 Sell at low price  0 0 1 0.7 
 Kill and sell meat   0 0 0 0 
 Kill and burn 0 0 1 0·. 
 Kill and bury  0 0 3 2.2 
 Kill and discard into river/waterways   0 0 0 0 
 Kill and eat   0 0 0 0 
 Nothing  0 0 35 25.7 
 Other – give medicine 51 79.6 67 49.3 
Negara, affected site Sector 3, n=14 Sector 4, n=188 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds 11 78.6 45 23.9 
 Sell at low price  0 0 1 0·5 
 Kill and sell meat   0 0 0 0 
 Kill and burn 0 0 6 3.2 
 Kill and bury  1 7.1 7 3.7 
 Kill and discard into river/waterways   0 0 0 0 
 Kill and eat   1 7.1 1 0.5 
 Nothing  0 0 60 31.9 
 Other – give medicine 6 42.8 77 41.0 
 
Lombok  
Pujut, non-affected site  Sector 3, n=40 Sector 4, n=160 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds 29 72.5 28 17.5 
 Sell at low price  3 7.5 45 28.1 
 Kill and sell meat   3 7.5 4 2.5 
 Kill and burn 0 0 1 0.6 
 Kill and bury  2 5 1 0.6 
 Kill and discard into river/waterways   0 0 0 0 
 Kill and eat   6 15.0 49 30.6 
 Nothing  0 0 32 20.0 
 Other – give medicine 20 50.0 37 23.1 
Pringgasela, affected site  Sector 3, n=30 Sector 4, n=70 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds 24 80 51 30 
 Sell at low price  1 3.3 0 0 
 Kill and sell meat   0 0 7 4.1 
 Kill and burn 0 0 0 0 
 Kill and bury  0 0 1 0.6 
 Kill and discard into river/waterways   0 0 1 0.6 
 Kill and eat   2 6.77 72 42.4 
 Nothing  1 3.3 32 18.8 
 Other – give medicine 9 30.0 33 19.4 
† Multiple responses included 
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Table 3:  Dead bird management across affected and non-affected sites on Bali and Lombok† 
 
Bali  
Manggis, non-affected site Sector 3, n=64 Sector 4, n=136 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds  11 17.2 10 7.4 
 Sell to neighbour in the village 0 0 0 0 
 Sell to dead bird collector 0 0 50 36.8 
 Burn 47 73.4 87 64 
 Bury 26 40.6 5 3.7 
 Discard into river/waterways 0 0 0 0 
 Consume  0 0 0 0 
 Nothing 4 6.3 3 2.2 
Negara, affected site Sector 3, n=14 Sector 4, n=188 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds  0 0 0 0 
 Sell to neighbor in the village 0 0 0 0 
 Sell to dead bird collector 0 0 45 23.9 
 Burn 10 71.4 130 9.0 
 Bury 9 64.3 17 9 
 Discard into river/waterways 0 0 1 0.5 
 Consume  0 0 1 0·. 
 Nothing 0 0 4 2.1 
Lombok 
Pujut, non-affected site Sector 3, n=40 Sector 4, n=160 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds  0 0 0 0 
 Sell to neighbour in the village 0 0 1 0.6 
 Sell to dead bird collector 5 12.5 1 0.6 
 Burn 26 65.0 121 75.6 
 Bury 5 12.5 31 19.4 
 Discard into river/waterways 0 0 0 0 
 Consume  0 0 1 0.6 
 Nothing 10 25.0 14 8.8 
Pringgasela, affected site Sector 3, n=30 Sector 4, n=170 
Action: n % n % 
 Separate from healthy birds  0 0 1 0.6 
 Sell to neighbour/dead bird collector  1 3.3 0 0 
 Burn 4 13.3 1 0.6 
 Bury 21 70.0 155 91.2 
 Discard into river/waterways 0 0 7 4.1 
 Eat  0 0 0 0 
 Nothing 0 0 0 0 
 Other (feed to fish, dogs) 7 23.3 11 6.5 
† Multiple responses included 
 
 
 
Vaccination and biosecurity:  Government policy in 
Indonesia is that vaccines for poultry must be purchased by 
owners – the government does not supply vaccine for any 
diseases. While bird owners may vaccinate against some bird 
diseases, they do not necessarily vaccinate against HPAI. On 
Bali, 92% of Sector 3 respondents and 34% of Sector 4 
respondents in Manggis reported that they vaccinated their 
birds, while 64% of Sector 3 and 23% of Sector 4 in Negara 
reported doing so. Thus, vaccination rates were actually 
lower in the subdistrict that had experienced a human HPAI 
case. On Lombok, Sector 3 respondents who reported 
vaccinating their birds varied from 10% (Pujut Subdistrict) to 
90% (Pringgasela subdistrict) and in Sector 4 from 33% 
(Pujut) to 25% (Pringgasela) (Table 2).  
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Table 4:  Willingness to report sudden death of poultry (% responding) across affected and non-affected sites on 
Bali and Lombok 
 
Bali  
Manggis, non-affected site Sector 3, n=64 Sector 4, n=136 
Action: n % n % 
 Yes 23 35.9 31 22.8 
 Maybe 5 7.8 7 5.1 
 No 36 56.3 98 72.1 
Negara, affected site Sector 3, n=14 Sector 4, n=188 
Action: n % n % 
 Yes 11 78.6 85 45.2 
 Maybe 1 7.1 7 3.7 
 No 2 14.3 96 51.1 
 
Lombok  
Pujut,  non-affected site Sector 3, n=37 Sector 4,  n=103 
Action: n % n % 
 Yes 29 78.4 25 24.3 
 Maybe 0 0 2 1.9 
 No 8 21.6 76 73.8 
Pringgasela, affected site  Sector 3, n=25 Sector 4, n=101 
Action: n % n % 
 Yes 17 68.0 18 17.8 
 Maybe 0 0 3 3.0 
 No 8 32.0 80 79.2 
 
 
 
The logistics of vaccinating non-commercial flocks is also 
problematic in that flocks are not confined in pens, but are 
free-ranging. As one key informant villager from the affected 
site in Lombok said: 
 
Nowadays it is very difficult to do vaccinations for kampong 
[free-ranging village] chickens because the chickens run free 
and are hard to catch, [and] the community’s perception [is] 
that their chickens are in a healthy condition and there is no 
need to be vaccinated. 
 
This was reiterated across many other Sector 4 participant 
groups. There is also a prevalent belief in some (but not all) 
communities that vaccination kills poultry, as told by a 
veterinarian in the animal health focus group at the affected 
site in Lombok: 
 
Sometime ago when we did vaccinations there was a 
complaint from the community that their ducks died. 
There is also a belief that vaccination of poultry would cost 
owners money: 
 
… they thought that it [vaccination] was not free … that is 
one of our obstacles. 
 
Respondents’ knowledge of prevention of bird-to-human 
transmission is presented in Table 5. 
 
Cultural and religious differences between the islands Bali (mainly 
Hindu) and Lombok (mainly Muslim) provide potential to 
enhance HPAI transmission in one respect. Both cultural/religious 
groups sacrifice poultry for ritual purposes and feasting. However, 
the extent and scale of Balinese rituals and feasting occurs on a 
much larger scale compared to that on Lombok. Because of these 
cultural practices, Bali receives live chickens and ducks in large 
numbers from other Indonesian islands, many of which enter 
illegally without regard for the quarantine ban on all live birds, 
with the exception of day-old chicks, thus further jeopardising 
biosecurity measures. 
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Discussion 
 
This study was conducted on two islands in sites both affected and 
non-affected by human cases of HPAI in poultry. Bali had 
experienced a human fatality in the affected site. Several 
differences became clear between the islands and also between the 
two kinds of sites explored. For example, there was a difference in 
the extent of vertical information flow of the national HPAI 
control program through the various levels of administrative 
governance – from national to provincial, then to districts, 
subdistricts, villages and subvillages. On Lombok, this flow was 
very limited beyond the subdistrict level. 
 
One major difference between Bali and Lombok is the good 
collaboration between public health and animal health agencies 
that have helped disseminate HPAI information between 
subdistrict and village and subvillage levels on Bali. This 
collaboration does not exist in Lombok; neither does 
dissemination of HPAI information below the subdistrict level. 
 
On Bali, the flow of information seems to have extended to 
village and subvillage levels in both sites through the effective 
collaborations of public health and animal health agencies and 
the strong subvillage administrative organisation known as the 
banjar system, unique to Bali. In Lombok there was very little 
collaboration between animal and human health agencies. 
Nevertheless, people in the affected sites on both islands 
appear to have absorbed more information than those in non-
affected areas, probably because of previous HPAI infection 
and contact with government agencies. 
 
Survey results and focus groups were also consistent in 
finding that knowledge of government activities was more 
extensive at Bali sites and that only limited government 
programs and activities occurred at village level on Lombok 
to promote community changes in knowledge, attitudes, 
skills and practices on HPAI. Probably as a result, Lombok 
Sector 4 survey respondents reported less disease prevention 
activity in their flocks. There was also a difference in disease-
prevention activity between affected and unaffected sites. 
 
The degree of community preparedness for HPAI on Bali and 
Lombok is minimal. It was found that activities conducted by 
government agencies from the provincial to the village levels are 
limited in scope36 and largely ineffectual2,25,27,37 in engendering safe 
poultry-handling practices and biosecurity measures. Participatory 
District Surveillance Response (PDSR) officers (Animal Health) 
appear to have focused principally on households keeping small 
numbers of often free-range chickens. As a result, the small 
commercial poultry producers have relied on supply companies 
for information on HPAI control and prevention. Villagers in the 
present study learned about HPAI mostly from national television 
programs, primarily news broadcasts, not official government 
publications or programs. 
 
Unsafe poultry management practices are still in place, 
especially with Sector 4. Participants generally did not apply 
recommended biosecurity measures to protect their birds 
from infection. Most Sector 4 respondents did not vaccinate 
their birds, regularly disinfect or even clean cages and pens, 
use masks and hand gloves in handling sick birds, or apply 
disinfectant for cleaning the bird pen if there was one. 
 
Vaccination is viewed with great scepticism, as others have 
found38. Vaccination rates were higher in Bali amongst both 
Sector 3 and 4 households than in Lombok. Most Sector 4 
respondents in Lombok did not vaccinate their birds, but 
some did in Bali. Several animal health agents concurred that 
there are logistical difficulties in capturing Sector 4 free-
ranging birds for vaccination. Interview data revealed that 
there have been negative results from some vaccinations 
(ie poultry have died). Where vaccinations did occur in 
poultry, they were for other poultry diseases and not HPAI. 
The major reason for this lack of compliance is economic. In 
contrast, Sector 3 farmers across both islands and all sites 
were mostly contracted to commercial poultry companies 
that ensured biosecurity measures are followed by providing 
appropriate technical services. Commercial and profit 
motives appear to drive better compliance. Large-scale 
vaccination efforts have not demonstrated effectiveness as a 
control measure39, and were stopped in Indonesia in 2007, as 
they were seen as a source of spread of virus by vaccination 
teams23. 
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Table 5:  Reported actions taken by households to protect poultry from diseases across affected and non-affected 
sites on Bali and Lombok† 
 
Bali  
Manggis, non-affected site Sector 3, n=64 Sector 4, n=136 
Action: n % n % 
 Clean pen/cage every day 23 35.9 14 10.3 
 Disinfect pen/cage on regular basis 49 76.6 5 3.7 
 Vaccinate birds 59 92.2 46 33.8 
 Separate new birds 20 31.3 5 3·7 
 Purchase healthy birds 23 35.9 16 11.8 
 Nothing  0 0 49 36.1 
Negara, affected site Sector 3, n=14 Sector 4, n=188 
Action: n % n % 
 Clean pen/cage every day 11 78.6 43 22.9 
 Disinfect pen/cage on regular basis 9 64.3 15 8.0 
 Vaccinate birds 9 64.3 43 22.9 
 Separate new birds 2 14.3 1 0.5 
 Purchase healthy birds 4 28.6 17 9 
 Nothing  0 0 97 51.6 
 
Lombok  
Pujut, non-affected site Sector 3, n=40 Sector 4, n=160 
Action: n % n % 
 Clean pen/cage every day 7 17.5 30 18.8 
 Disinfect pen/cage on regular basis 17 42.5 1 0.6 
 Vaccinate birds 36 90 53 33.1 
 Separate new birds 3 7.5 1 0.6 
 Purchase healthy birds 3 7.5 15 9.4 
 Nothing  1 2.5 58 36.3 
Pringgasela, affected site Sector 3, n=30 Sector 4, n=170 
Action: n % n % 
 Clean pen/cage every day 7 23.3 50 29.4 
 Disinfect pen/cage on regular basis 13 43.3 3 1.8 
 Vaccinate birds 27 90 3 1.8 
 Separate new birds 0 0 1 0.6 
 Purchase healthy birds 2 6.7 14 8.2 
 Nothing  0 0 37 21.8 
† Multiple responses included 
 
 
 
Symptoms of various bird diseases are similar and 
indistinguishable without laboratory testing, Because bird 
mortality from all causes has always been high, it is 
understandable that respondents aren’t viewing HPAI as 
different or more serious than the bird morbidity and 
mortality they are used to. 
 
Participants offered ideas for additional education efforts that 
might have more chance of penetrating the communities. 
These included information disseminated through local 
leaders, through mosques, and through cadre forums (groups 
of voluntary or poorly compensated health workers recruited 
from villages). 
 
While the Indonesian government’s planning efforts for HPAI 
are commendable, the plan is not presently effective, as it 
depends on the cooperative actions of people with small rural 
farms who have not been consulted in the development of the 
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plan, have not been adequately instructed on the nature of the 
plan, and perceive no benefits to themselves from prevention 
efforts. The present study found, as have others, that 
compensation mechanisms are problematic (2,23} and 
amounts offered by the government for culled birds are 
considered far too low36,38. Risk-based culling may reduce the 
number of birds that need to be killed while still reducing 
human infections40. Better collaboration between public 
health and animal health agencies is essential11. 
 
Bali, especially, has a large international and national tourist 
industry. One of the complexities of the zoonotic disease 
profile, and its containment, is that local officials may be 
reluctant to acknowledge an outbreak for fear of the resultant 
economic distress that reduced tourism numbers would 
bring41,42. 
 
This study supports previous findings that effective health 
promotion and disease prevention efforts are complicated 
when the distance – geographically, culturally, and socially – 
between government agencies and rural, indigenous people is 
great43,44 and when people are required to give up a valuable 
asset to meet a goal that they can’t appreciate45. Such 
measures are likely to be less effective than would be 
expected in the best of times46. It also confirms that a 
bureaucratic, formulaic approach to disease prevention, 
especially when such an approach comes from a centralised 
governmental body, will be insufficient, and that an effective 
approach will need to be interdisciplinary47 and involve 
community people in development and decision-
making14,23,27,28,48,49. With so many other causes of morbidity, 
mortality and social distress prevalent, HPAI barely registers 
as a matter of concern2. 
 
In contrast to findings of others investigating HPAI 
prevention efforts2,43, study respondents on Bali (but not 
Lombok) reported a good relationship between public and 
animal health agencies at all administrative levels in 
promoting HPAI control and education programs. 
 
A potential limitation of this research is that the research 
team worked across cultures. This holds the potential for 
mistranslation and for perceptions of miscommunication 
implicit in developed world researchers working with 
indigenous participants50. The authors tried to control for this 
by training local people to work with them on participant 
recruitment and data collection. 
 
The authors consider the interdisciplinary and international 
nature of the research team as a potential strength. This 
project brought together the disciplines of medical 
anthropology, epidemiology, public health disease prevention 
practice, vaccinology and veterinary science. Collaborations 
such as this one, particularly between the human and animal 
health sectors, are essential for risk assessment, surveillance 
and the development of effective control strategies11. 
 
Another strength is the mixed methods study design. Results 
were triangulated across the quantitative and qualitative data 
collection arms, with results from one supporting those 
obtained through the other51. Another is that primary data 
rather than surrogate measures52 were collected. 
 
Conclusions 
 
On the basis of these findings, the authors recommend the 
following further actions: 
 
1. More effective communication is needed between 
subdistrict levels and village/community levels, and 
could be improved through field agents trained in 
communication techniques with village people. 
2. A participatory approach is needed, with village 
level people consulted in all phases of development 
and delivery of prevention strategies. 
3. Communication should take place at places where 
owners of poultry meet and feel at ease to ask field 
officers questions about HPAI. This should be in 
addition to mass media communication. 
4. The formation of cooperatives/associations/ 
networks of small farms might also contribute to 
more effective promotion of behavioural changes at 
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the community level and to articulate the concerns 
and interests of small farmers to the government. 
5. Development of school programs that focus on 
living with animals, including information about 
diseases of animals and zoonotic diseases and the 
environmental factors surrounding the management 
of sick and dead poultry, could instil a prevention 
ethos. Children at primary, elementary and high 
school could be taught about safe handling of poultry 
and the hygiene practices necessary in keeping their 
poultry or pets and themselves healthy (eg cage and 
pen cleaning, handwashing and changing clothes). 
6. Operational research is needed to identify best 
approaches or models in disseminating information 
on HPAI that results in improving people’s 
attitudes, skills and practices within current 
household structures. It is unlikely that a single such 
model could be devised that would work for the 
whole of the country. Rather, priority must be given 
to community/village participation on their terms. 
Existing desa siaga programs, which already operate 
in in many villages on Bali and some on Lombok, 
can work well for a number of village-based 
activities. 
 
For Sector 4 poultry raisers on Bali and Lombok, and for 
many around the world like them10, flocks are their 
livelihoods, primary sources of food, important 
social/cultural totems (especially on Bali) or primary sources 
of income. Most of these people are fairly poor. Chickens are 
often their only ready cash assets. From their perspective, it 
is an entirely rational decision to deal with sick birds by 
converting them to something useful (revenue or a meal) as 
quickly as possible. 
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